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It was 3 a.m. on Oct. 7, and Ronen Bar, the pinnacle of Israel’s home safety service, nonetheless couldn’t decide if what he was seeing was simply one other Hamas navy train.
On the headquarters of his service, Shin Guess, officers had spent hours monitoring Hamas exercise within the Gaza Strip, which was unusually energetic for the nighttime. Israeli intelligence and nationwide safety officers, who had satisfied themselves that Hamas had no real interest in going to battle, initially assumed it was only a nighttime train.
Their judgment that night time might need been totally different had they been listening to visitors on the hand-held radios of Hamas militants. However Unit 8200, Israel’s alerts intelligence company, had stopped eavesdropping on these networks a yr earlier as a result of they noticed it as a waste of effort.
As time handed that night time, Mr. Bar thought that Hamas would possibly try a small-scale assault. He mentioned his issues with Israel’s prime generals and ordered the “Tequila” group — a gaggle of elite counterterrorism forces — to deploy to Israel’s southern border.
Till almost the beginning of the assault, no one believed the state of affairs was severe sufficient to get up Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, in line with three Israeli protection officers.
Inside hours, the Tequila troops had been embroiled in a battle with hundreds of Hamas gunmen who penetrated Israel’s vaunted border fence, sped in vehicles and on motorbikes into southern Israel and attacked villages and navy bases.
Essentially the most highly effective navy power within the Center East had not solely utterly underestimated the magnitude of the assault, it had completely failed in its intelligence-gathering efforts, largely resulting from hubris and the mistaken assumption that Hamas was a menace contained.
Regardless of Israel’s refined technological prowess in espionage, Hamas gunmen had undergone in depth coaching for the assault, nearly undetected for not less than a yr. The fighters, who had been divided into totally different items with particular targets, had meticulous data on Israel’s navy bases and the format of kibbutzim.
The nation’s as soon as invincible sense of safety was shattered.
Greater than 1,400 folks had been killed, together with many ladies, kids and previous individuals who had been murdered systematically and brutally. Lots of are held hostage or are nonetheless lacking. Israel has responded with a ferocious bombardment marketing campaign on Gaza, killing greater than 8,000 Palestinians and wounding hundreds extra, in line with the Hamas-run well being ministry. The Israeli navy on Sunday signaled a heavier assault on Gaza, saying it had expanded its floor incursion in a single day.
Israeli officers have promised a full investigation into what went fallacious.
Even earlier than that inquiry, it’s clear the assaults had been potential due to a cascade of failures over current years — not hours, days or even weeks. A New York Instances examination, primarily based on dozens of interviews with Israeli, Arab, European and American officers, in addition to a evaluation of Israeli authorities paperwork and proof collected for the reason that Oct. 7 raid, reveals that:
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Israeli safety officers spent months making an attempt to warn Mr. Netanyahu that the political turmoil attributable to his home insurance policies was weakening the nation’s safety and emboldening Israel’s enemies. The prime minister continued to push these insurance policies. On someday in July he even refused to fulfill a senior normal who got here to ship a menace warning primarily based on labeled intelligence, in line with Israeli officers.
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Israeli officers misjudged the menace posed by Hamas for years, and extra critically within the run-up to the assault. The official evaluation of Israeli navy intelligence and the Nationwide Safety Council since Might 2021 was that Hamas had no real interest in launching an assault from Gaza that may invite a devastating response from Israel, in line with 5 folks aware of the assessments who spoke on the situation of anonymity to debate delicate particulars. As a substitute, Israeli intelligence assessed that Hamas was making an attempt to foment violence towards Israelis within the West Financial institution, which is managed by its rival, the Palestinian Authority.
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The assumption by Mr. Netanyahu and prime Israeli safety officers that Iran and Hezbollah, its strongest proxy power, introduced the gravest menace to Israel diverted consideration and assets away from countering Hamas. In late September, senior Israeli officers instructed The Instances they had been involved that Israel may be attacked within the coming weeks or months on a number of fronts by Iran-backed militia teams, however made no point out of Hamas initiating a battle with Israel from the Gaza Strip.
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American spy businesses lately had largely stopped gathering intelligence on Hamas and its plans, believing the group was a regional menace that Israel was managing.
General, vanity amongst Israeli political and safety officers satisfied them that the nation’s navy and technological superiority to Hamas would hold the terrorist group in examine.
“They had been in a position to trick our assortment, our evaluation, our conclusions and our strategic understanding,” Eyal Hulata, Israel’s nationwide safety adviser from 2021 till early this yr, stated throughout a dialogue final week in Washington sponsored by the Basis for Protection of Democracies, a assume tank.
“I don’t assume there was anybody who was concerned with affairs with Gaza that shouldn’t ask themselves how and the place they had been additionally a part of this large failure,” he added.
Many senior officers have accepted duty, however Mr. Netanyahu has not. At 1 a.m. Sunday in Israel, after his workplace was requested for touch upon this text, he posted a message on X, previously Twitter, that repeated remarks he made to The New York Instances and blamed the navy and intelligence providers for failing to offer him with any warning on Hamas.
“By no means and at no stage was Prime Minister Netanyahu warned of battle intentions on the a part of Hamas,” the publish learn in Hebrew. “Quite the opposite, the evaluation of the whole safety echelon, together with the pinnacle of navy intelligence and the pinnacle of Shin Guess, was that Hamas was deterred and was looking for an association.”
Within the ensuing furor, Benny Gantz, a member of his battle cupboard, publicly rebuked Mr. Netanyahu, saying that “management means displaying duty,” and urged the prime minister to retract the publish. It was later deleted, and Mr. Netanyahu apologized in a brand new one.
On Sunday, Shin Guess promised a radical investigation after the battle. The I.D.F. declined to remark.
The final time Israelis’ collective perception of their nation’s safety was equally devastated was 50 years earlier, at the beginning of the Yom Kippur Battle, when Israel was caught off guard by an assault by Egyptian and Syrian forces. In an echo of that assault, Hamas succeeded as a result of Israeli officers made most of the identical errors that had been made in 1973.
The Yom Kippur Battle was “a basic instance of how intelligence fails when the coverage and intelligence communities construct a suggestions loop that reinforces their prejudices and blinds them to adjustments within the menace setting,” Bruce Riedel, a former prime Center East analyst on the Central Intelligence Company, wrote in a 2017 analysis paper concerning the 1973 battle.
In an interview this month, Mr. Riedel stated that Mr. Netanyahu was reaping the results of specializing in Iran because the existential menace to Israel whereas largely ignoring an enemy in his yard.
“Bibi’s message to Israelis has been that the true menace is Iran,” he stated, utilizing Mr. Netanyahu’s nickname. “That with the occupation of the West Financial institution and the siege of Gaza, the Palestinian subject is not a menace to Israel’s safety. All of these assumptions had been shattered on Oct. 7.”
Ignored Warnings
On July 24, two senior Israeli generals arrived on the Knesset, Israel’s parliament, to ship pressing warnings to Israeli lawmakers, in line with three Israeli protection officers.
The Knesset was scheduled that day to present closing approval to one among Mr. Netanyahu’s makes an attempt to curb the facility of Israel’s judiciary — an effort that had convulsed Israeli society, ignited large avenue protests and led to large-scale resignations from the navy reserves.
A rising portion of the Air Pressure’s operational pilots was threatening to refuse to report back to obligation if the laws handed.
Within the briefcase of one of many generals, Aharon Haliva, the pinnacle of the Israeli Protection Forces’ Navy Intelligence Directorate, had been extremely labeled paperwork detailing a judgment by intelligence officers that the political turmoil was emboldening Israel’s enemies. One doc acknowledged that the leaders of what Israeli officers name the “axis of resistance” — Iran, Syria, Hamas, Hezbollah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad — believed this was a second of Israeli weak spot and a time to strike.
Hezbollah’s chief, Hassan Nasrallah, in line with one of many paperwork, stated that it was mandatory to organize for a serious battle.
Normal Haliva was prepared to inform the coalition leaders that the political turmoil was creating a chance for Israel’s enemies to assault, significantly if there have been extra resignations within the navy. Solely two members of the Knesset got here to listen to his briefing.
The laws handed overwhelmingly.
Individually, Gen. Herzi Halevi, the navy’s chief of employees, tried to ship the identical warnings to Mr. Netanyahu. The prime minister refused to fulfill him, the officers stated. Mr. Netanyahu’s workplace didn’t reply to a request for remark about this assembly.
The generals’ warnings had been largely primarily based on a collection of provocations on Israel’s northern border.
In February and March, Hezbollah had despatched explosive-laden drones towards Israeli gasoline rigs. In March, a militant climbed over the border fence from Lebanon into Israel, carrying a number of highly effective bombs, weapons, telephones and an electrical bike on which he traveled to a serious northern intersection. He then used a robust cost, apparently making an attempt to explode a bus.
On Might 21, Hezbollah staged for apparently the primary time battle video games at one among its coaching websites in Aaramta in south Lebanon. Hezbollah launched rockets and flew drones that dropped explosives on a simulated Israeli settlement.
Israeli officers believed that Hezbollah was main the planning for a coordinated assault towards Israel, however not one that might immediate an all-out battle.
The officers’ issues grew by means of August and September, and Normal Halevi went public together with his issues.
“We have to be extra ready than ever for a multi-arena and in depth navy battle,” he stated at a navy ceremony on Sept. 11, simply weeks earlier than the assault.
Mr. Netanyahu’s allies went on Israeli tv and condemned Normal Halevi for sowing panic.
In a collection of conferences, Shin Guess gave comparable warnings to senior Israeli officers as Normal Halevi. Finally, Mr. Bar additionally went public.
“From the investigations we’re doing we will say at the moment that the political instability and the rising division are a shot of encouragement to the nations of the axis of evil, the terrorist organizations and the person threats,” Mr. Bar stated in a speech.
Mr. Netanyahu’s authorities additionally ignored warnings from Israel’s neighbors. Because the custodian of Muslim holy websites in Jerusalem, Jordan has historically been an vital mediator between Palestinians and Israel’s authorities on the Aqsa Mosque compound, the third most holy website in Islam. The mosque compound has seen repeated raids by Israeli forces through the years, and Hamas has stated that it launched this month’s assault partly as retaliation for these acts.
However Jordan discovered that when Mr. Netanyahu shaped a authorities late final yr, essentially the most far proper in current historical past, it was much less receptive to their warnings that the incidents on the Aqsa Mosque compound was stirring up sentiment inside Palestinian territories that might boil over into violence, in line with two Arab officers with information of the connection.
The Mistaken Focus
Whereas safety and intelligence officers had been proper a couple of coming assault, their intense concentrate on Hezbollah and Iran had a tragic impact: Far much less consideration was paid to the threats from Gaza. Since Israel’s withdrawal in 2005 and Hamas’s evolution from a purely guerrilla group into the governing energy of Gaza in 2007, Hamas had solely periodic skirmishes with the Israeli navy.
Below 4 totally different prime ministers, Israel repeatedly determined that reoccupying Gaza and crushing Hamas would price too many lives and do an excessive amount of harm to Israel’s worldwide popularity.
Israel knew that Hamas, which Iran helps with funding, coaching and weapons, was rising stronger over time. However officers thought they might comprise Hamas with an in depth community of human spies, refined surveillance instruments that might ship early warnings of an assault and border fortifications to discourage a Hamas floor assault. In addition they relied on the Iron Dome air protection system for intercepting rockets and missiles launched from Gaza.
The technique, confirmed by a number of Israeli officers, bore some fruit. Through the years, Israel’s funding in penetrating Hamas’s interior circle in Gaza allowed Israel to uncover the group’s assault plans and sometimes led to assassinations of Hamas leaders.
Strengthening Hamas
Publicly, Mr. Netanyahu used blunt rhetoric about Hamas. His election slogan in 2008 was “Sturdy In opposition to Hamas,” and in a single marketing campaign video on the time he pledged: “We won’t cease the I.D.F. We’ll end the job. We’ll topple the phobia regime of Hamas.”
Over time, nonetheless, he got here to see Hamas as a method to steadiness energy towards the Palestinian Authority, which has administrative management over the West Financial institution and has lengthy sought a peace settlement in Israel in alternate for a Palestinian state.
Mr. Netanyahu instructed aides through the years {that a} feeble Palestinian Authority lowered the strain on him to make concessions to Palestinians in negotiations, in line with a number of former Israeli officers and other people near Mr. Netanyahu. An official in Mr. Netanyahu’s workplace, who spoke on the situation of anonymity, denied this had been the prime minister’s coverage.
However there is no such thing as a query that Israeli officers considered Hamas as a regional menace, not a world terrorist group like Hezbollah or the Islamic State. This view was shared in Washington, and American intelligence businesses devoted few assets to gathering data on the group.
Some elements of the American authorities even believed that Hamas operatives could possibly be recruited as sources of details about terrorist teams thought of extra pressing priorities in Washington.
Jonathan Schanzer, a former Treasury Division official and now the senior vp for analysis on the Basis for Protection of Democracies, recalled a gathering he had in 2015 with American intelligence and regulation enforcement officers about suspected Hamas operatives inside the US.
In the course of the assembly, he recalled, the officers instructed him they had been making an attempt to show the Hamas operatives into “belongings” within the battle towards the Islamic State.
The Invincibility of the Wall
Israeli officers firmly believed that “The Barrier” — an almost 40-mile-long strengthened concrete wall above and under floor, accomplished in 2021 — would hermetically seal off Gaza. There was additionally a surveillance system on the border primarily based virtually solely on cameras, sensors and remote-operated “sight-shooter” methods, 4 senior Israeli navy officers instructed The Instances.
Senior Israeli navy officers believed that the mixture of distant surveillance and machine-gun methods with the formidable wall would make it virtually unattainable to infiltrate Israel, and thus cut back the necessity for numerous troopers to be stationed on the bases.
However Hamas’s assault uncovered the fragility of that expertise. The group used explosive drones that broken the mobile antennas and the distant firing methods that protected the fence between Gaza and Israel.
To get round Israel’s highly effective surveillance expertise, Hamas fighters additionally appeared to implement strict self-discipline among the many group’s ranks to not focus on its actions on cellphones. This allowed them to tug off the assault with out detection, one European official stated.
The group almost certainly divided its fighters into smaller cells, every most likely solely educated for a particular goal. That manner, the rank and file didn’t perceive the dimensions of the assaults they had been making ready for and couldn’t give away the operation if caught, a European official stated, primarily based on his evaluation of how the assault unfolded and from the movies the group disseminated from the operation.
Hamas might have realized such operational self-discipline from Hezbollah, which has lengthy confused Israeli forces on the battlefield by dividing its fighters into smaller items of buddies or family, in line with Lebanese officers with ties to the group. If the fighters converse brazenly on cellphones to coordinate navy operations, Lebanese officers with ties to the group stated, a part of their code is to talk in childhood reminiscences — for instance, asking to fulfill up in a area the place they as soon as performed collectively.
Hamas claimed that 35 drones took half within the opening strike, together with the Zawari, an explosive-laden drone.
“We began receiving messages that there was a raid on each reporting line,” testified one soldier, who was on the Gaza Division base on the day of the invasion, in a dialog with the “Hamakom Hachi Ham Bagehinom” (“The Hottest Place in Hell”) web site.
“On each reporting line, swarms of terrorists had been coming in,” the soldier added. “The forces didn’t have time to come back and cease it. There have been swarms of terrorists, one thing psychotic, and we had been merely instructed that our solely selection was to take our toes and flee for our lives.”
In a dialog with navy investigators two weeks after the assault, troopers who survived the assault testified that the Hamas coaching was so exact that they broken a row of cameras and communication methods in order that “all our screens turned off in virtually the very same second.” The results of all this was a close to complete blindness on the morning of the assault.
After the preventing had stopped, Israeli troopers discovered hand-held radios on the useless our bodies of a few of the Hamas militants — the identical radios that Israeli intelligence officers had determined a yr in the past had been not value monitoring.
Farnaz Fassihi contributed reporting from New York, and Eileen Sullivan from Washington.
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