Jokowi’s post-election sport plan – New Mandala

On 25 October Prabowo Subianto registered his candidacy for Indonesia’s 2024 presidential election. This declaration itself carried little shock. The previous common’s presidential ambitions have been an open secret; having tried twice and failed in 2014 and 2019, it was clear to anybody who is aware of a bit about Indonesian politics that he would attempt for the third time in 2024.

Whereas Prabowo declaring his presidential aspiration may need been a non-story, what drew extra public curiosity, and scrutiny, was the announcement that Gibran Rakabuming, president Joko Widodo’s (Jokowi) oldest son, could be Prabowo’s vice-presidential candidate.

By giving “permission”—some would say advocating for—his son to run alongside Prabowo, Jokowi has finished one thing that no Indonesian presidents earlier than him had finished: he put his youngster explicitly on a path to the best elected workplace within the nation. The notoriously corrupt and nepotistic Soeharto gave his youngsters candy enterprise offers. However the closest his youngsters ever been to a state place was when he appointed one among his daughters, Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana, as a minister in his final cupboard in 1998.

Megawati Soekarnoputri and her late husband Taufik Kiemas had all the time been mentioned to have excessive hopes for his or her daughter, Puan Maharani, to turn into vp and even president. However thus far they’ve by no means put her on a presidential ticket. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), too, had equally excessive ambitions for the political way forward for his eldest son, Agus. However voters appear to disagree with a father’s glowing hope for his son: Agus was eradicated within the first spherical of the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election, and his low electability rankings have by no means put him inside hanging distance of a presidential ticket.

A lot has been written about this Prabowo–Gibran declaration from the angle of political dynasticism,  or about how this political manoeuvre has upset even Jokowi’s inside circle and positioned him in opposition to his personal celebration, PDI-P and its matriarch Megawati. These are all essential and fascinating views. However I’m interested by one thing completely different: not solely in Jokowi’s objectives and techniques, however extra importantly in components which will hinder or facilitate the attainment of those objectives.

Jokowi’s finish sport

I attribute two finish objectives to Jokowi’s many political manoeuvres, from co-opting the Constitutional Court docket, till not too long ago underneath the management of a chief justice who was his brother in-law, to having his son positioned as Prabowo’s operating mate.

First, Jokowi is interested by guaranteeing the safety of his political and financial legacies. He’ll need the brand new capital metropolis of Nusantara to proceed, the “omnibus” Legislation on Job Creation to remain because the legislation of the land, for infrastructure growth to develop, and for the useful resource nationalism and downstreaming (hilirisasi) paradigm to thrive, amongst others.

Second, Jokowi is interested by sustaining some stage of political clout. This can’t be separated from the primary purpose. In a celebration system the place events don’t have distinct and constant platforms, a pacesetter’s insurance policies typically may be superior and preserved solely via personalistic appeals.

But it surely additionally goes past the primary set of coverage objectives sketched above. The integrity and capability of the judiciary and the broader prison justice system have all the time been a work-in-progress in Indonesia. Sustaining political clout after leaving workplace means decreasing the chance of the justice system being turned in opposition to one’s self and one’s household—whether or not unjustifiably as a part of a political vendetta, justifiably as a result of against the law one did whereas in workplace, or a mixture of each.

These two objectives deliberately underplay the dynastic part of Jokowi’s manoeuvres. Political dynasticism is unhealthy for democratic life, however it’s seemingly only a means to an finish. To some, a political dynasty is a way to make sure their descendants have entry to wealth and energy. To others, it’s a means to make sure that their visions of the society might be applied. Nonetheless, to some others, it’s a means to get across the problem of a low-trust surroundings: turning to household networks turns into an inexpensive technique if you can’t belief your political allies to behave in your pursuits.

Why Prabowo may very well be a miscalculation

In attaching his son to Prabowo’s ticket, Jokowi clearly sees it as essentially the most possible method to obtain his political objectives. He seemingly believes that Prabowo, if successful the election, will safe his coverage legacy. He additionally believes that having his son within the second highest workplace within the nation will preserve, if not develop, the household’s political clout and defend it from political and authorized witch-hunts.

Beliefs can flip into actuality. However beliefs may also be a miscalculation. There are three the reason why inserting his political future in Prabowo is likely to be a severe miscalculation for Jokowi.

The primary motive is that even when Prabowo wins the election Jokowi won’t have an electoral automobile, within the type of a celebration, that he can management to affect policymaking within the parliament (DPR). By supporting Prabowo, Jokowi virtually deserted the celebration that made him a family title, PDI-P. It’s maybe true that Jokowi was by no means answerable for PDI-P anyway due to Megawati’s position because the celebration’s matron. However, for higher or worse, PDI Perjuangan stood by Jokowi’s facet in all of his signature insurance policies―the brand new capital, the omnibus legislation, the revisions to the anti-corruption legislation, the brand new prison code, to call a number of.

Because the political scientist E. E. Schattschneider famous, “[m]odern democracy is unthinkable save by way of events.” Jokowi won’t be able to affect what is occurring and mentioned in parliament until he has a celebration that he controls. Irrespective of how in style Jokowi is amongst voters, these DPR members will hearken to and obey solely their celebration leaders.

The second motive is that Prabowo is a army determine nonetheless in style within the military. As a president, he may have the weapons and the troops underneath his sway—each formally attributable to his place and informally attributable to his lasting army affect. It isn’t in any respect clear how Jokowi thinks he can persuade a army man to do his bidding as soon as he’s exterior the circle of energy.

To make issues tougher, Jokowi himself has all however assured the army’s rising affect in Indonesian politics by increasing the alternatives for army officers to carry civilian workplace. For Jokowi to suppose that Prabowo the president could be the identical man as Prabowo the defence minister could be at finest naïve and at worst delusional. One doesn’t merely instruct the lads controlling the weapons what to do, particularly if one now not has the authority to take action.

Third, with no political automobile and missing entry to coercive drive, Jokowi must depend on grassroots actions to remain related. But, Jokowi is once more missing right here. Jokowi just isn’t Abdurrahman Wahid, who commanded tens of hundreds of loyal followers in Nahdlatul Ulama. He has voters, however not essentially the militant supporters one can deliver to avenue demonstrations and put stress on the federal government. It stays to be seen whether or not his supporter networks corresponding to ProJo will keep loyal after he now not has patronage to distribute.

These are the reason why backing Prabowo may very well be seen a miscalculation. However it isn’t my level to argue that it’s: backing Prabowo remains to be a calculated transfer, albeit a excessive danger one. One can simply observe a minimum of two eventualities the place this calculated danger would yield a excessive return.

When Prabowo pays off

Simply to handle the elephant within the room, the primary state of affairs is anxious with the truth that Prabowo is now not younger. If he wins the election he could be sworn into workplace on 20 October, 2024 on the age of 73, simply 4 years shy of the age of Soeharto when he was compelled to step down by scholar protests. Ought to Prabowo in some unspecified time in the future now not have the capability to execute the duties of the presidency, Gibran must step up and not one of the above challenges concerning the boundaries on Jokowi’s post-presidential energy would matter anymore.

The second state of affairs is that if Jokowi, via some manoeuvres, manages to take management of one of many main events throughout a Prabowo presidency. This may give him a political automobile to affect policymaking and an precise mass base to mould and persuade Prabowo’s administration.

The appointment of Jokowi’s youngest son, Kaesang Pangarep, as chairperson of the Indonesian Solidarity Social gathering (PSI) is a transfer in that route. However PSI is simply too small to be effectual. To affect policymaking, Jokowi wants a much bigger celebration. Golkar is an interesting goal. It has no ideological platform and no abiding attachment to particular person leaders. It’s merely drawn to energy and whoever wields it. A senior Golkar determine put it bluntly that “Golkar has no expertise for being in opposition, as a result of it was born to be in energy and handle the federal government.”

The truth that Jokowi has planted favours amongst influential Golkar figures by having them as ministers, and that Jokowi’s long-time ally and confidante Luhut Pandjaitan is the chair of the celebration’s advisory board, may assist with such a takeover. Within the Golkar celebration congress scheduled for 2024, Jokowi may assist a management ticket amicable to his agenda, or he may merely put ahead his household to fill in key positions at Golkar, as rumours about Gibran and his son-in-law (and incumbent mayor of Medan) Bobby Nasution leaving PDI-P and becoming a member of Golkar appear to recommend.

One other interesting takeover goal is probably moderately shocking: PDI-P. In the end Megawati, 76 years outdated, has to move the management baton to somebody. Puan Maharani is an apparent alternative attributable to her Soekarno ancestry. However many contained in the celebration may wish to modernise it and lead it in a unique route. Soekarno and ties with Soekarno would nonetheless be essential, however as a logo and ideological compass greater than an computerized admission ticket to the management place.

Ought to such a gap occur, Jokowi could be able to make the most of it. It could be a wedding of comfort: Jokowi would have a political automobile to proceed his affect even after leaving workplace, and PDI-P would have a well-liked vote getter who’s their cadre, although maybe within the eyes of many within the celebration, a once-disgraced one.

Conclusion

Jokowi has positioned his eggs within the Prabowo basket. However it’s unlikely that he’ll simply pray that the basket is sweet. Jokowi is aware of that if he may flip his again on the celebration that had been his house for 20 years, there is no such thing as a motive why Prabowo couldn’t do the identical to him as soon as in energy.

He must take additional steps to guard his funding in Prabowo, whether or not by institutionalising his volunteer networks or, extra seemingly, by guaranteeing management of and persevering with assist from one of many main events. Solely via these steps can Jokowi be certain that his assist for Prabowo won’t find yourself as a miscalculation.